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POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM CONTRA 
POPULISM 
THE CIVIC CONSTITUTION: CIVIC VISIONS AND 
STRUGGLES IN THE PATH TOWARD 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY. By Elizabeth 
Beaumont.1 Oxford University Press. 2014. Pp. xvi + 343. 
$49.95. 
PEOPLING THE CONSTITUTION. John E. Finn.2 
University Press of Kansas, 2014. Pp. xv + 350. $39.95. 
Corey Brettschneider3 
Theorists of “popular constitutionalism” seek to ground 
constitutional interpretation in the democratic value of self-
government. They claim that the “people themselves,” and not 
judges, should have the democratic authority to interpret the 
Constitution. These theorists regard judicial review by elite, 
unelected judges as being “counter-majoritarian” or 
undemocratic. 
In attempting to synthesize democratic and constitutional 
theory, however, popular constitutionalism faces some 
challenges. Specifically, I have argued previously that one of the 
leading popular constitutionalists, Larry Kramer, leaves two 
fundamental questions unanswered in his book, The People 
Themselves.4 First, it is unclear who the “people” are. Kramer 
alternates between discussions of state legislators, Congress, and 
social movement leaders, implying that any entity but the Court 
could count as the people. 
 1. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.  
 2. Professor of Government, Wesleyan University. 
 3. Professor of Political Science, Brown University. 
 4. LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); see also Corey Brettschneider, Popular Constitutionalism 
and the Argument for Judicial Review, 34 POL. THEORY 516 (2006).  
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Second, Kramer’s account leaves open why popular 
constitutionalism is constitutionalist, as opposed to being only 
populist. At points in his book, it seems that a policy counts as 
constitutionally legitimate solely because it comes from the 
decisions or voices of a majority of non-judicial actors. But this 
overlooks the possibility that majorities may support 
unconstitutional positions. On my view, therefore, Kramer’s 
popular constitutionalism lacks a set of independent standards 
that could be used to determine whether or not the majority 
position is consistent with the principles and requirements of the 
Constitution. Kramer compounds this difficulty with a final 
chapter that appeals to relativism, or the notion that 
constitutional meaning is merely what various political actors say 
that it means. 
 Liz Beaumont in her book, The People Themselves, offers 
a clear answer to these two challenges to popular 
constitutionalism that improves on Kramer’s approach. 
Beaumont forcefully argues that the people interpreting the 
Constitution are defined by the rhetoric of social movements. She 
persuasively shows how participants in social movements 
expanded the language of constitutional rights through everyday 
deliberations, their correspondence, and in their participation in 
protests and other politics “out of doors.” The terms they used to 
advance their arguments ultimately influenced the doctrines of 
the most important precedents of the Supreme Court. The great 
cases expanding rights protections drew their content and power 
from the language of social movements. 
 Beaumont thus offers a unique account of how to reconcile 
democracy with constitutional rights that limit majoritarian 
decision-making. These rights do not originate with elite and 
undemocratic judges. Although judges articulate constitutional 
rights in the rulings of the Supreme Court, they base their 
understanding of these rights in the discourse of the wider 
democratic culture. Equal protection of the law and civil rights for 
African-Americans and women have their roots in the popular 
discourse of citizens involved in social movements. Although 
eventually codified as doctrine, these rights are grounded in the 
protests of ordinary citizens involved in the Women’s Movement 
and the Civil Rights Movement. Even substantive due process 
rights, often thought to be the most contentious counter-
majoritarian doctrine of the Court, have a popular 
constitutionalist basis, according to Beaumont. These rights were 
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advocated by the Anti-Slavery Movement to protect the liberties 
of African-Americans. 
Beaumont’s grounding of civil rights and due process rights 
in social movements gives these areas of constitutional law a deep 
kind of democratic authority. This point, made through rich and 
detailed history, is a distinctive contribution to the literature of 
constitutional theory. Her vision of the “people” is not a vague 
appeal to legislative enactments. It is a well-documented 
description of how the rhetoric of social movements influenced 
constitutional interpretation and eventually became law. 
 Two central examples illustrate the importance of her view. 
The first concerns the role of free speech and the revolutionary 
spirit of “positive liberty.” In the twentieth century, deliberative 
democrats such as Alexander Meiklejohn argued that the First 
Amendment should be understood as enabling democratic 
discourse and discussion.5 Without the ability to freely hear and 
make all arguments, citizens would be unable to give their 
informed consent to laws, and democracy would be impossible. 
Although free speech often involves “negative rights” against 
state coercion, it is rooted in a democratic concern for “positive 
liberty” that enables participation in government. This is often 
thought to be a recent argument, but Beaumont demonstrates 
that it arose in early discussions of free speech. In the debates 
leading to the ratification of the Constitution, citizens supported 
the First Amendment to protect the ability to participate in 
political discussion free from tyranny. Beaumont persuasively 
demonstrates that the revolutionary context made the First 
Amendment a product of popular constitutionalism. This 
argument is a major contribution to our thinking about the First 
Amendment’s free speech protection. 
 A second example of Beaumont’s use of history to provide 
important insights into constitutional theory is her chapter on the 
introduction of women’s suffrage to the Constitution. Beaumont 
notes American constitutional scholars have largely ignored this 
topic because women’s suffrage has been thought to be a 
consequence of expanding the franchise to African Americans. 
Beaumont persuasively demonstrates that the Amendment was 
instead the product of a deeper debate about whether the 
Constitution regarded women as occupying a non-public domestic 
sphere. The victory for women’s suffrage not only added another 
 5. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948).   
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right, but more fundamentally, it gave women a public role and 
entitled them to be treated as free and equal citizens. 
 So far I have elaborated on Beaumont’s notion of the 
“people.” I turn now to the way she answers the question of how 
we might distinguish popular constitutionalism from populism. 
Beaumont does this by considering what might be said about 
popular movements that oppose rights protections. At different 
points in American history, citizens have used the language of 
constitutionalism to attack rights, though they have often failed. 
For example, how should popular constitutionalism regard a 
popular movement that advocated a “separate spheres” 
constitution that would leave women solely as domestic agents 
with no public role? 
Unlike Kramer, Beaumont is clear that the Constitution is 
not defined by the most popular social movements. In 
Beaumount’s account, the Constitution is defined by inclusive 
rights, and these rights provide an independent standard to judge 
the changes to the Constitution that particular social movements 
advocate. These changes should be judged by whether they are 
advancing constitutional rights, not by the sheer number of people 
who have joined the social movement. Since Beaumont provides 
an independent standard, in the form of constitutional rights, for 
judging the changes proposed by social movements, she avoids 
collapsing constitutionalism into pure populism. 
John Finn’s important book, Peopling the Constitution, 
shares Beaumont’s commitment to the notion that non-judicial 
actors have a role in interpretation. But despite the points of 
agreement in their projects, there is a fundamental difference. 
While Beaumont stresses the continuity of popular constitutional 
interpretation and the courts, where important cases often draw 
their arguments from the discourse of social movements, Finn 
stresses more of a dissonance between the “civic” and the 
“juridical” constitution. The civic constitution is defined by the 
interpretation of non-judicial actors in civil society, such as social 
movements. Here the content of the constitutional text is realized 
by popular deliberation and interpretation. In contrast, the 
“juridical” constitution is defined by courts and lawyers. Finn 
regards the juridical constitution as lacking in life and tending to 
be mistaken in its content compared to the civic constitution. He 
characterizes the contemporary juridical constitution as a “rot” 
that has strayed from its constitutional ideals. While Finn defines 
the civic constitution as being shaped by mass participation and 
fidelity to high ideals, he views the juridical constitution as  
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depriving rights and excessively deferring to presidential 
authority. 
Finn draws his inspiration from civic republican theory, 
particularly the work of Jürgen Habermas, who emphasizes the 
public sphere as the ground for constitutional rights.6 Drawing 
from Habermas, Finn explains that if constitutional interpretation 
were merely left to courts, the result would be a constitution that 
lacked the vigor of democratic life. It would only reflect the views 
of a homogenous group of lawyers and judges. By contrast, a 
constitution shaped by civil participation would embody the 
cultural and religious diversity of the wider society. It is the public 
sphere of constitutional interpretation, more than courts and 
judges, that give the Constitution meaning and authority. 
Finn’s claim is not only Habermas’ idea that the people have 
democratic authority in virtue of their mass participation, 
although that is part of his argument. Finn’s argument is that the 
people interpreting the civic constitution tend to be better at 
making constitutional decisions than the elite group of lawyers 
that sit on the nation’s courts. The Constitution itself protects 
rights of diversity in speech, religion, and politics. It should not be 
surprising that a homogeneous Supreme Court tends often to rob 
that document of its pluralistic quality. Finn criticizes, as an 
example of the disconnect between constitutional meaning and 
lawyerly interpretation, a noted constitutional law professor who 
encouraged students not to read the constitutional text. In 
contrast to this often incorrectly interpreted “juridical 
constitution,” the civic constitution, as understood by many 
citizens participating in civil society, is truer to the meaning of the 
Constitution and its protection of pluralism. Like Beaumont, Finn 
offers a way to distinguish popular constitutionalism from 
populism. The people should be deferred to because they are 
better at constitutional interpretation than the courts. 
Part of Finn’s argument turns to the text of the Constitution 
to make its point. The constitutional ideals of equal protection of 
the law and freedom of speech are accessible to many citizens, and 
are not limited to being understood by lawyers. These provisions 
are best discussed widely and affirmed by citizens. 
The last third of Finn’s book is a criticism of recent 
constitutional history. In City of Boerne v. Flores7 he argues the 
 6. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A 
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1998).  
 7. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  
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Supreme Court declared itself the sole interpreter of the 
Constitution, suggesting the demise of the role of the people in 
constitutional interpretation. What has followed, not unrelatedly 
in his view, is a demise as well of the constitutional ideal of limited 
government. In particular, he is critical of how much the Supreme 
Court’s modern separation of powers doctrine has deferred to the 
executive. This “rot,” as he describes it, is directly the result of an 
exclusive emphasis on the Court as an interpreter of the 
Constitution. The decline in citizens’ involvement in interpreting 
the constitution has been followed by an erosion of constitutional 
liberty. 
I admire much in Finn’s insightful book. His discussion of the 
Court’s deference to executive power and his critique of Boerne 
are very well done. His criticisms of the juridical constitution 
should motivate scholars to pay greater attention to the role of the 
civic constitution. I think his point about the plain meaning of 
much of the Constitution’s text is especially important. He 
convincingly demonstrates that there is nothing about law school 
that would give special insight into this document. The text is 
indeed accessible and understandable to the people as a whole. 
But ultimately, I think Finn’s view is too dismissive of the 
ways that the juridical and civic constitutions might interact and 
inform one another. Finn does recognize that there are moments 
where juridical and civic constitutions merge. But I think he 
places too little emphasis on these affinities. Although he would 
be skeptical of Beaumont’s view of how the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional interpretation is informed by social movements, I 
share her vision that judicial interpretation and civic demands for 
rights can work in tandem. Reflecting this influence, the language 
of the Court has often been aspirational, and not just legalistic, at 
crucial moments in American history. The Court has powerfully 
articulated Constitutional ideals during the end of legalized 
segregation, in the rise of privacy rights, and in the recognition of 
equal protection for women. 
I also disagree with Finn’s dismissal of the potential 
educative effects of the Supreme Court. He looks upon the civic 
constitution as a corrective to the legalistic interpretation of the 
document by courts. In this account, the Supreme Court should 
not inform the public, but the influence should only run from the 
public to the Court. The public, in Finn’s view, corrects the court’s 
decisions and its legalistic tendencies. 
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But I would argue that not all constitutional developments 
are “bottom up” in the way Finn describes. Sometimes the Court 
can inform the public in a way that opens up possibilities in 
advancing constitutional rights. For example, when the Court 
struck down a discriminatory referendum in Romer v. Evans,8 it 
did anything but shut down discussion about gay rights. It 
challenged the actions of the majority of Colorado’s citizens and 
reignited civic debate about gay rights that eventually culminated 
in the marriage protections passed by several states. The case is a 
recent reminder that the people do not always uphold 
constitutional rights, but there is a role for courts as well in 
defending rights.  
 I do not want to suggest, however, that Finn completely 
separates the civic and juridical constitutions. Finn does think that 
the civic and judicial constitutions do sometimes support one 
another, despite his skepticism of recent constitutional history. 
But I would differ in at least one of the moments where he sees a 
merger of these two constitutions. Finn thinks the decision in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder9 is one of the points in which the juridical 
constitution affirms the civic constitution. On his view, the Amish 
way of life serves as a symbol of the vast diversity of the civic 
constitution. In claiming their rights, the Amish defended and 
exemplified the pluralism of the civic constitution. He concludes 
that this was a rare moment when the Supreme Court deferred to 
and learned from the civic constitution. 
I found Finn’s use of this case helpful in elaborating his vision 
of how the civic constitution can correct the juridical constitution. 
But I think the case also raises potential objections to his 
approach to the Constitution. First, Finn often characterizes the 
juridical constitution as being the creation of distant and elite 
judges. But court cases have an important participatory 
component, in that they are started when ordinary citizens file suit 
to protect their rights. For example, Amish parents filed suit in 
Yoder. More generally, all constitutional cases start with 
individual litigants seeking to defend their rights. As Alon Harel 
puts it, judicial review is not merely an act of judges, but it is often 
about ordinary citizens having a “right to a hearing.”10 Finn’s 
framing of the juridical constitution as being the creature of 
 8. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 9. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 10. See Alon Harel, Judicial Review and the Value Theory of Democracy, 47 
REPRESENTATION 63 (2011); Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, The Right to Judicial Review, 92 
VA. L. REV. 991 (2006).   
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judges obscures the way that individuals can use the judicial 
system to protect their rights. Even when there is not mass 
participation, individual litigants can actively claim their 
individual rights through law and the juridical constitution. 
Second, Yoder brings out a potential problem with Finn’s 
emphasis on diversity as the basis for the civic constitution. The 
content of the Constitution is about the rights of individuals. 
While for Finn, the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause 
stands as an example of deference to the diversity of groups, most 
constitutional clauses respect rights of individuals, often as against 
the interest of groups. On this point, Finn does note Justice 
Douglas’ dissenting argument in Yoder. Douglas writes that 
allowing the Amish to withdraw their children from school might 
deprive the individual children of the education they need to 
become full citizens. Indeed, Finn admits that it may have been 
right for Wisconsin to make civic education classes mandatory for 
all children, including Amish children. But I think this obscures 
the real choice between a commitment to civic education and 
religious pluralism present in the case. Finn wants to defend both 
these values and admirably seeks ways of doing so. But courts can 
face real conflicts between pluralism and civic diversity. The 
Amish resistance to teaching abstract notions of the kind essential 
for civic education suggests that there is no easy way to avoid this 
conflict. Indeed, at a deeper level the case suggests how the rights 
of individuals, such as the Amish children, might be at odds with 
the views of a group. In that case, individuals need courts to 
protect their rights from groups in civil society. 
 
